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Abstract
County governments are a crucial component of the fabric of American democracy.
Yet there has been almost no previous research on the policy e↵ects of the partisan
composition of county governments. Most counties in the United States have small
legislatures, usually called commissions or councils, that set their budgets and other
policies. In this study, we examine whether counties with Democratic legislators spend
more than counties with Republican ones. We assemble an original dataset of 10,708
elections in approximately 298 medium and large counties over the past 25 years. Based
on a regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a Democratic legislator rather
than a Republican one leads the average county to increase spending by about 5%.
Overall, our findings contribute to a growing literature on the policy consequences of
partisan control of state and local government. They show that the partisan selection
of county legislators has important policy e↵ects in county governments.
Keywords: Local politics, representation, elections, institutions
Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition. Replication files
are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop).
Introduction
Counties have often been called “forgotten governments” by scholars of local politics (Marando
and Thomas, 1977; Schneider and Park, 1989). The bulk of the modest prior literature on
county governments has been conducted by scholars of public administration (e.g., Benton,
2002, 2003).1 As a result, despite the fact that 48 states have county elected o cials and 39
states hold partisan elections in either all or some of their counties (National Association of
Counties, 2008), we know little about the impact of public opinion, elections, and legislative
partisanship on county policies and other political outcomes (Benton, 2005).
This is an important gap in our knowledge of local politics because county governments
are a crucial component of the fabric of American democracy. They spend nearly 400 billion
dollars each year and employ over 2.5 million people (U.S. Census of Government, 2012).
Most counties in the United States have small legislatures, usually called commissions or
councils, that set their budgets and other policies. Moreover, counties have continued to
grow in size — both in terms of the number of employees and their expenditures — relative
to cities and townships, indicating a greater role over the last half century (Cigler, 1995;
Benton, 2002). Increasingly since the 1970s, counties have taken over service delivery for
citizens even in metropolitan areas with central municipalities (Benton and Rigos, 1985;
Benton and Menzel, 1993).
The longstanding wisdom in local politics research has been that local-level politics is
devoid of the type of partisan conflict that dominates national policy-making. According to
this line of thinking, local governments primarily deal with nonpartisan issues because there
is “no Republican way to pave a street and no Democratic way to lay a sewer” (Adrian, 1952,
766). Indeed, one study describes elections in counties as “centered less on ideology than are
1 The work in the public administration literature has focused on the structure of county institutions, political
leadership, and the role of counties within the federal system in the United States. Counties have been used
to examine how reformed government structure a↵ects policy (DeSantis and Renner, 1996; Menzel, 1996;
Morgan and Kickham, 1999; Schneider and Park, 1989), the causes of adopting home rule charters (Martin
and Nyhan, 1994; Salant, 1993), and how to improve the e ciency of service delivery when confronted with
growing populations (Palumbo and Hallett, 1994; Park, 1996).
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most American electoral contests” (Cigler, 1995, 65). Taken to their logical extension, these
arguments suggest that partisan control of local governments might not matter for policy. A
growing body of evidence, however, suggests that partisanship might matter in local politics
in much the same way that it matters in national politics (Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014;
Einstein and Kogan, 2015; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016).2
While we might expect that the partisanship of county o cials should matter for policy
just as the partisanship of other elected o cials a↵ects policies, counties face a number of
constraints which could limit the impact of partisanship (Peterson, 1981, 1995; Rae, 2003;
Self, 2003). Because a large proportion of counties’ funding is provided by states and their
autonomy is often restricted by statutes, scholars have argued that counties have little poli-
cymaking leeway (Benton, 2003; Marando and Reeves, 1991). Counties also receive a greater
share of their revenues from intergovernmental aid than municipalities. Finally, counties face
economic constraints due to the ability of citizens and businesses to move to nearby lower
tax counties. The partisanship of elected o cials may matter less in counties than at other
levels of government as a result of these constraints.
In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of the e↵ect of the partisan
composition of county legislatures on county fiscal policies. Focusing on counties with more
than 150,000 people in 2010, we build an original dataset of 10,708 election returns in 298
counties. We then merge these data with information on legislators’ ideology based on their
campaign contributions and data on county fiscal policies from the Census of Local Govern-
ments. We use regression discontinuity models to estimate the causal e↵ect of the partisan
outcome of county elections on the ideology of the winning legislator and the subsequent
fiscal policies of county governments.
2 A number of studies have found an association between public opinion and local fiscal policies in cities
(Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; Einstein and Kogan, 2015; Palus, 2010) and counties (Choi et al., 2010;
Percival, Johnson, and Neiman, 2009; Ybarra and Krebs, 2016). While there has been an active debate
about the e↵ect of municipal o cials’ partisanship on local fiscal policies (e.g., Ferreira and Gyourko,
2009; Gerber and Hopkins, 2011), recent work shows that mayoral partisanship has an important e↵ect on
policy. Democratic mayors spend more than Republican mayors in medium and large cities, largely through
increases in debt (de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016).
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We find that Democratic legislators that win narrow elections are far more liberal than
Republican winners. Turning to the policy e↵ects of county elections, we find that the
election of Democratic legislators rather than Republican legislators leads to about 5.5%
greater county expenditures, and it has even larger e↵ects on some individual policy areas.
More Democratic county legislatures also increase revenue relative to Republican ones. Our
results indicate that although counties are constrained by higher-level governments (states)
and lower-level governments (cities), these constraints still allow for partisan elections to
have a meaningful impact on county policy.
We also examine factors that might moderate the e↵ect of partisanship on policy. We
find suggestive evidence of several moderators. First, partisanship has a greater influence on
policy when the legislature is closer to evenly split between parties. Second, the partisanship
of legislators matters more in smaller legislatures. Third, it matters more in counties with a
commission form of government. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the partisanship
of county legislators has larger e↵ects in states where counties are less dependent on inter-
governmental revenue. Overall, these results show that the influence of partisan selection of
county legislators on policy may be driven in part by the power those legislators wield, either
via independent authority due to their form of government, the size of their legislature, or
their reliance on state funding.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the policy e↵ects of the partisan
composition of local governments, and extends this literature in a number of important ways.
Our results provide the first evidence that the partisan composition of county governments
has policy e↵ects. Future work could extend our analysis by examining the e↵ect of the
partisan composition of county governments on non-fiscal policies. Our paper is also one of
the first to examine local legislatures rather than executives. Future research could use a
similar approach to examine the policy e↵ects of the partisan or ideological composition of
city councils, school boards, and other local legislatures.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the previous literature on representation,
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elections, and partisanship in local government — and the surprising lack of research on
this question at the county level. Next, we discuss our original data and research design.
Then, we present our findings on the impact of partisanship in county government on county
expenditures. We then discuss institutional moderators for these e↵ects. Finally, we conclude
and discuss implications for the study of representation and local politics.
Theoretical Framework
Despite the constraints on county governments, there are an array of reasons to expect
that the partisan composition of county government should a↵ect county fiscal policies.
Democrats generally prefer a greater amount of government expenditures than Republicans.
A variety of research has shown that Democratic legislators have more liberal preferences
than Republicans in both Congress and state legislatures (Lee, Moretti, and Butler, 2004;
Shor and McCarty, 2011). Moreover, the election of Democratic governors and state legisla-
tures leads to more liberal state policies (Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu, 2017).3 This may be
especially true for redistributive policies, where Democrats at the national level are likely to
prefer higher redistributive spending.
At the local level, Einstein and Glick (2018) show that Democratic mayors tend to
have more liberal preferences on fiscal issues. Other work has shown that the election of a
Democratic mayor leads to greater municipal spending (de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw,
2016).4 We expect these same tendencies to be true at the county level. Indeed, previous
research shows that politicians across levels of government form coalitions via political par-
ties (Aldrich, 1995). We therefore expect that the election of Democratic county legislators
3 Early research done on state governments tended to show very weak evidence of e↵ects of partisan control
(e.g., Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993). However, polarization between the parties at the elite level has
clearly grown over time. As a result, the policy e↵ects of the partisan composition of government have also
grown (Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu, 2017).
4 It is worth noting that these recent findings stand in contrast to earlier work, such as Ferreira and Gyourko
(2009) and Gerber and Hopkins (2011), which found largely null e↵ects of the partisanship of government
on city fiscal policy. Part of the discrepancy may be due to the time period examined, the size of cities in
the data used by di↵erent authors, model specification in Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), and a lack of power
in Gerber and Hopkins (2011) (de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016, p. 1133-1134).
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will similarly result in elected representatives with more liberal preferences. Moreover, we
expect that the election of individual legislators has the potential to change the ideology of
the median voter in the legislature and have an e↵ect beyond simply changing the partisan
seat share in the legislature (Krehbiel, 1998). This could be especially true if the ideological
preferences of Democratic legislators are far from the preferences of Republican legislators.
Theoretically, this ideological di↵erence should be the driving mechanism behind the changes
in policy that result from the election of legislators from di↵erent parties.
Given this, the election of a Democratic legislator rather than a Republican legislator
should lead to an increase in county spending. In addition, we expect that these e↵ects
may be concentrated in some of the most contentious areas of local-level policy. In line with
Einstein and Glick’s (2018) findings that Democratic mayors tend to favor more redistributive
policies than Republican mayors, we expect that Democratic county politicians will be more
likely to spend more on redistributive policies.
Moderators
The e↵ect of electing a Democrat versus a Republican may be stronger under certain condi-
tions than others. In other words, there may be factors that moderate the e↵ect of partisan-
ship on policy. Here we examine four such factors: whether an election is likely to influence
the majority coalition, the relative voting power of an individual legislature, the form of
county government, and the degree of constraints on county fiscal policies.
First, the election of individual legislators might have the potential to change the majority
party in control of the chamber. This e↵ect could go beyond simply changing the pivotal
vote or the partisan seat share in the legislature if the majority party holds significant
power — above and beyond their numerical advantage — through their ability to control
the agenda using procedural rules (e.g. Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Second, we might
expect the e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator to be larger in counties with small
legislatures since each legislator has more voting power than in a legislature with many
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members (Muzzio and Tompkins, 1989; Riker, 1962). Thus, each election is likely to have a
larger e↵ect on the ideological composition of the legislature than in larger chambers. Third,
individual legislators may also wield more power in counties with the commission form of
government, in which legislators often lead a certain department of county government,
relative to counties with elected executives or the council-manager form of government, in
which a singular other o cer (elected or appointed) may wield more power than individual
legislators (ACIR, 1972). Finally, county elections might have larger policy e↵ects in counties
that have fewer constraints and more policy flexibility. Specifically, counties that rely less on
intergovernmental revenue may make fiscal policy decisions that are less constrained by their
state government, resulting in more variable spending (Benton, 2003; Marando and Reeves,
1991).5
Data and Research Design
In order to examine the policy e↵ects of the partisan composition of county governments,
we collect data on county legislative elections and fiscal policy in medium and large counties
with partisan elections and with a population of more than 150,000 people in 2010.6 We focus
on medium and large counties because these counties are likely to have more fiscal flexibility
than smaller ones. In addition, it is much easier to collect elections data for medium and
large counties than for smaller counties.7 In all, there are 319 counties in our target universe,
which cover 47.9% of the U.S population. We then merge these data with information on
legislators’ ideology based on their campaign contributions and fiscal information from the
Census of Local Governments. Finally, we use regression discontinuity models to assess the
5 In fact, in 2012, approximately 35% of the average county’s aggregate revenues came from the state and
federal government (U.S. Census of Government, 2012).
6 Our target universe also does not include counties that are consolidated with cities (e.g., counties in New
York City) and counties in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Vermont that lack elected governments.
7 In our preliminary research, we found that it was nearly impossible to find election results for many counties
with fewer than 150,000 people since elections in these rural counties are often not covered by the news
media and they usually have only a handful of election results on their website. Hopkins and Pettingill
(forthcoming) also note the di culty of obtaining election results for smaller local governments.
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causal e↵ects of legislative partisanship on county fiscal policies.
County Election Data
The study of local elections has long been stymied by a lack of centralized publicly-available
data (Trounstine, 2009). In particular, there is no publicly available dataset of county
election outcomes. This makes it impossible to examine the causes and consequences of
these elections. To address this gap, we build the first large-scale dataset of county election
outcomes. In order to assemble this original dataset, we gathered data from a number of
di↵erent sources. First, we scraped data on county elections from OurCampaigns.com (OC),
a crowd-sourced political information website that allows users to contribute information on
candidates and campaigns at all levels of government.8 Next, we collected data on election
returns from county websites and by contacting local election o cials. Then, we added
information from local newspaper archives.9 We also obtained data that Jessica Trounstine
generously shared on elections in Arizona, Idaho, New Jersey, and South Carolina. We
obtained data on elections in California, Kentucky, and Louisiana from the Local Elections
in America Project (Marschall and Shah, 2016).
The final dataset that we use in our analysis consists of 10,708 individual elections in
large counties with partisan elections. Our dataset includes election results from 298 counties
in 36 states, which cover over 45% of the United States’ total population.10 Our counties
closely match the demographics of our target universe of medium and large counties (see
Supplementary Appendix A).11 Figure 1 shows the size of the legislatures in the counties
8 Data from OC have been previously used by de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016), Miller (2013), and
Vogl (2014). Local elections listed here have the date of the election, candidate names and partisanship,
vote totals, and often even more detailed information on the candidates. These user-contributed sources
ranged from archived newspaper articles to o cial county election returns.
9 We used newspapers archives available through NewsLibrary, Newspapers.com, ProQuest Archiver, Access
Newspaper Archive, and Google News.
10 In parallel, we also assembled data on the overall partisan composition of county legislatures in our target
universe. In some of these counties, we were unable to find district-level election returns, but we found
information on the overall partisan composition of the county legislature.
11 In spite of this, one limitation of our data is that the coverage is uneven over time. We have election
results on 291 counties in the post-2000 period. Yet due to the limitations of archival data sources, our
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in our dataset. Most counties have very small legislatures. The median size of county
legislatures in our data is 5. Less than 20% of the counties have more than 10 members and
only a handful have more than 25 members.
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Figure 1: Size of County Legislatures in our Dataset
Figure 2 shows how the partisan composition of counties in our dataset has changed over
the past 25 years.12 The black solid line plots the local average, while the dashed and dotted
lines plot the average in each year split by southern counties and non-southern counties.
On the whole, the Democratic seat share of county councils trends from 51% Democratic in
1990 to only 40% Democratic by 2014. The trends in county legislatures also follow national
electoral tides: when Republicans increased their presence in Congress after both the 1994
and 2010 elections, county legislatures also became more Republican on average. And with
the Democratic victories in Congress and the presidency in 2008, county legislatures also
had a corresponding trend toward Democrats. Just as state-level and national elections
correspond, county legislative elections follow similar patterns to the nation overall (Rogers,
coverage shrinks as we move backwards in time. For example, we only have data from about 150 counties
going all the way back to the early 1990s.
12 We plot data here only for counties in which we have data for at least a span of 25 years.
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2016; Hopkins, 2018). This overall stability in the partisan composition of county councils
masks significant geographic heterogeneity, however. As shown by the dashed line, counties
in the South were quite Democratic in the beginning of our time period — higher than the
average across all counties — but are less Democratic by 2014. The long-term trend towards
more Republican county councils is driven mainly by these counties in the South.
Non−South
South
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
De
m
oc
ra
tic
 S
ha
re
 o
f C
ou
nt
y C
ou
nc
il
Figure 2: Average National and Regional-level Democratic Seat Share Across Time
Ideology of County Legislators
To measure the ideological preferences of the candidates running in these individual county
legislative races, we merge our elections data — the names and locations of candidates
— with campaign donations data from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME, Bonica, 2013).13 We approximate the ideology of county elected o cials
who contribute to campaigns using the “CFscores” in these contributor-level data.14
13 Specifically, we match the candidates in each county legislative election to the names in the DIME database
of 15 million campaign contributors in the 1980-2012 election cycles. We were able to match 2,316 of the
total 8,476 winning legislators in our data to valid unique contributors. More details on this matching
process are in Supplementary Appendix F.
14 These scores are based on the linkages between all campaign contributors and candidates in federal and
state elections. The assumption behind this measure is that contributors donate, on average, to more
ideologically-proximate candidates rather than more distant ones. The result of this is a measure of
9
County Fiscal Data
To study the impact of the partisan composition of county legislatures on county fiscal out-
comes, we use fiscal data from the Historical Data Base of Individual Government Finances.
These data are based on a Census of Governments conducted every five years and the Annual
Survey of Governments collected in every non-census year. These data provide detailed ex-
penditure and revenue data for U.S. local governments.15 We adjusted all monetary figures
into 2012 dollars based on the consumer price index. In our main analysis, we use per capita
expenditures and revenues to account for population di↵erences across counties.
On average, counties in 1990 spent approximately $1,101 per capita and their revenue
totaled $1,123 per capita, with an outstanding debt level of $1,062 per capita (all in 2012
dollars). By 2014, expenditures had grown to an average of $1,689 per capita while revenues
totaled $1,953 per capita on average and debt totaled $1,005 per capita. Big counties in the
U.S. spend a little more than half the per capita amount that large cities do, have less than
half the amount of debt that large cities do, but raise more in revenue (de Benedictis-Kessner
and Warshaw, 2016). This suggests that while cities may fund much of their expenditures
with debt, counties tend to spend much more in line with their current revenues.
Within these totals, counties divided their expenditures among a variety of categories,
and similarly raised their revenue from a variety of sources. Figure 3 shows the division of
total expenditures into various categories in counties in our target universe of large counties
from 1990 to 2014. Across the entire time period, counties spent the largest amount on
redistribution (a combination of healthcare, hospitals, housing, and welfare), education, and
administration. While the level of many of these spending areas is relatively constant over
time, public safety expenditures rise steadily by more than 65% between 1990 and 2012 in
revealed behavior that can be used as a proxy for county legislative candidates’ ideology, much in the way
that other researchers have used these scores to compare the ideology of candidates in federal, state, and
city elections, as well as corporate executives, judges, agency appointees, lawyers, and medical professionals
(Bonica, 2014; Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014; Bonica, Chilton, and Sen, 2015; Bonica, 2016).
15 For our analysis on the causal impact of legislators, it is crucial to accurately assign fiscal data to the
appropriate year. As a result, we dropped a small number of observations from the Annual Survey of
Government Finances where we could not determine the year in which fiscal data was collected.
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Figure 3: Expenditures per capita over time, individual categories (target universe)
the average county. Redistributive spending and education and libraries spending also rise
steadily by more than 26% and 22%, respectively, during the same period.16
Figure 4 similarly shows revenue raised from specific categories as well as debt in the
average county in our target universe from 1990 to 2014. Their total revenues are divided
between taxes, intergovernmental revenue, and charges. This division stays fairly consistent
across the time period from 1990 to 2014. Generally, counties tend to raise most of their
revenues through taxes — primarily the property tax. The average overall outstanding debt
fluctuates over time. In 1990, the average county in our target universe had debt of about
$1,005 per capita. After 2006, the outstanding debt rises compared to overall revenue, even
surpassing revenue at a maximum of $1,280 per capita in 2009.
The overall stability in the average levels of spending and revenue mask quite a great
deal of variation in the data within each year. This massive cross-sectional variation in both
expenditures and revenue across counties could allow a small number of outliers to drive our
16 See Supplementary Appendix A for more detailed information on trends in expenditures.
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Figure 4: Revenue per capita over time, individual categories (target universe)
results. To reduce this possibility, we focus on changes in the natural log of spending and
revenue in our main analyses. The results for logged values of the outcome variables can
be interpreted approximately as the percentage change in expenditures or revenue due to
electing a Democratic legislator (Gelman and Hill, 2007, 60-61). However, the results are
substantively similar for non-logged values of the outcome variable.
Regression Discontinuity Design
We use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the e↵ect of electing county legis-
lators of di↵erent parties on county fiscal policy.17 We exploit the fact that a sharp electoral
threshold, 50% of the two-party vote share, determines which party wins county legislative
17 Previous studies in the urban politics literature have also used the regression discontinuity design to exam-
ine the local incumbency advantage (de Benedictis-Kessner, 2018; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; Trounstine,
2011), the e↵ects of mayoral partisanship on policy (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; Gerber and Hopkins,
2011; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016), black mayors on city policies (Hopkins and McCabe,
2012), and partisan selection in school boards on segregation (Macartney and Singleton, 2018).
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elections.18 The validity of the RD design depends on the assumption that only the winning
candidate — and not the distribution of units’ potential outcomes — changes discontinu-
ously at the threshold (Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw, 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Consistent
with the large-scale validation of electoral regression discontinuity (RD) design studies con-
ducted by Eggers et al. (2015), we observe no significant discontinuities in lagged values
of the running variable or other key placebo variables (Appendix B). In order to increase
statistical e ciency, we estimate treatment e↵ects on changes in expenditures rather than
on levels (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).19
We estimate the e↵ect of electing a Democratic county legislator rather than a Repub-
lican legislator based on the “jump” in outcome variables at the threshold. We model the
relationship between the assignment and outcome variables with local linear regression, using
the default optimal bandwidth options in the rdrobust package in R (Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik, 2014a).20 The optimal bandwidth is chosen to minimize mean-square-error
(MSE) and confidence intervals are adjusted to account for remaining bias (Calonico, Cat-
taneo, and Titiunik, 2014b; see also Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012).21 In order to address
the fact that there are often multiple elections in a given year for a particular county, we
cluster standard errors by county-year.22
A final complication for our analysis is that while the vast majority of county legislatures
are very small (see Figure 1), with five or fewer members, our dataset is heavily skewed
18 In multimember districts, we compare the winners and runner-up for the last seat in the district (e.g., in
a district with three legislators, we compare the votes of the 3rd and 4th placed candidates).
19 Specifically, our main analysis focuses on the di↵erence between logged fiscal outcomes in the year the
county legislator was elected and the average of outcomes measured two and three years after the election.
Gerber and Hopkins (2011) and de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) use a similar approach.
20 In our main analysis, we use the default local linear regression in rdrobust because Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2014b) show that local linear regression models perform well in RD designs with optimal
bandwidth selection (see also Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik, 2017, 41-42). Moreover, Gelman and Imbens
(2017) show that “controlling for global high-order polynomials in regression discontinuity analysis is
a flawed approach with three major problems: it leads to noisy estimates, sensitivity to the degree of
the polynomial, and poor coverage of confidence intervals.” They “recommend researchers instead use
estimators based on local linear or quadratic polynomials or other smooth functions.” It is worth noting,
however, that we obtain similar results using higher-order polynomials in our analysis (see Appendix C).
21 Our results are robust to this choice of bandwidth, however. We show our e↵ects for other bandwidths
than the optimal-MSE one in Appendix C.
22 We use the ‘cluster’ option in rdrobust.
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toward the small number of counties with larger legislatures. For example, fewer than 20%
of counties in our data have ten or more members in their legislatures. But over half of the
elections in our dataset come from these counties. Moreover, the handful of counties with
25 or more members constitute over 16% of our dataset. We are not as interested in the
e↵ect of a legislator’s election on policy as we are in the e↵ect in an average county council
of electing an additional partisan legislator. To address the over-representation of counties
with large legislatures in our dataset, we weight our regression discontinuity analyses based
on the number of legislators in each county legislature relative to the average number of
legislators. This enables us to interpret the results as the e↵ect of elections in the average
county rather than the average election. This approach prevents the handful of counties with
very large legislatures from driving our results. In Appendix C, however, we show that the
unweighted results are substantively similar to the weighted results.
Results
In this section, we examine the e↵ects of partisanship in county legislative elections. First, we
examine whether the partisanship of county legislators a↵ects their ideological orientation.
We then examine whether the partisanship of county legislators a↵ects county fiscal policies.
Partisan E↵ects on Ideology of County Legislators
What are the ideological consequences of electing a Democrat rather than a Republican to
the county legislature? In order to examine this question, we use a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) to isolate the causal e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator rather than a
Republican on the CF-Scores of the winning legislator.
We plot these results in Figure 5 with the Democratic margin in the election plotted
along the horizontal axis — meaning that elections in which the Democrat won are to
the right of zero, while those elections where the Republican won are to the left — and
14
the campaign-finance-based ideology score plotted along the vertical axis. The trend lines
plot local linear regressions within the bandwidth selected to minimize mean-squared error
(Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014b). As indicated by the di↵erence between the
two regression lines at the 0% threshold, we find that electing a Democratic rather than a
Republican county legislator causes conservatism to decrease by about 1.4 units (1.7 standard
deviations). This indicates that even in very close elections where the Democratic and
Republican candidates both received close to 50% of the vote, there are very large di↵erences
between Democrats and Republicans.
As new legislation cannot pass without the median’s support, the ideological location of
the median is likely to have an important influence over the policymaking process. Given the
e↵ects of the partisan outcome of elections on the winning legislator’s CF-Score in individual
elections, it follows that the median of the county legislature as a whole is likely to change.
This would be especially true in small legislatures, where changing the ideology of one
legislator can shift the median of the chamber by a larger amount.23
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Figure 5: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on legislator CF-Score.
23 It is di cult to directly test this proposition with our data because of the missingness in our measure of
legislators’ ideology. While we can calculate the shift in legislators’ ideology as individuals, developing an
appropriate measure of the median in a legislature would require knowing the ideology of all legislators.
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Partisan E↵ects on County Fiscal Policies
Next we move to our main results on the policy e↵ects of county legislative elections. First,
we show the descriptive association between changes in the partisan composition of county
legislatures and changes in county spending. Then, we examine the causal e↵ect of electing
a Democratic legislator rather than a Republican legislator using a regression discontinuity
design. Both of these analytical strategies yield similar results indicating that the partisan
composition of county legislatures has a significant e↵ect on county spending.
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Figure 6: Association between Changes in Partisan Composition of County Legislators and
Changes in County Spending. The bubbles show average changes in expenditures in each
3.33% bin.
In order to conduct a first cut at the relationship between the partisan composition of
county legislature and county spending, we examine the association between changes in the
partisan composition of county legislatures and changes in county spending. By examining
changes rather than levels, this analysis controls for many of the potential confounders.
We plot these results in Figure 6, with open circles indicating binned means of the change
in Democratic seat share, along the horizontal axis, and change in logged spending along
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the vertical axis. The positive slope of the trend line indicates that when counties become
more Democratic in the makeup of their legislators they spend more money per capita. Of
course, the association between changes in the partisan composition of county legislatures
and county expenditures could be confounded by any number of omitted variables. This
leads us to pursue our second analytical strategy.
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Figure 7: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged per capita county ex-
penditures in the fiscal years two and three years after an election
In order to determine the causal relationship between changes in the partisan composi-
tion of county legislatures and county spending, we turn to a regression-discontinuity design.
This enables us to isolate the causal e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator, rather than a
Republican, on county spending. We plot these results in Figure 7 using the same presenta-
tional strategy as in Figure 5, with the Democratic margin in the election plotted along the
horizontal axis — with Democratic victories to the right of zero and Republican victories to
the left. Along the vertical axis we plot the change in logged per capita expenditures, with
positive values meaning an increase in spending over previous years’ level of spending and
negative values meaning a decrease in spending. The trend lines plot local linear regressions
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within the bandwidth selected to minimize mean-squared error (Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik, 2014b). The large vertical jump between the two lines at the threshold value of
zero along the horizontal axis indicates the e↵ect of electing a Democrat rather than a Re-
publican on policy. In the average county, electing a Democratic legislator increases average
per capita spending in the fiscal years two and three years after an election by about 5.5%
relative to electing a Republican legislator.24 We next explore the persistence of the e↵ect
of partisan selection in county legislative elections on spending (Figure 8).25 We find that
it takes legislators two years to have an e↵ect on county expenditures.26 The e↵ects peak
three years after the election. Then the e↵ect gradually decays until it largely disappears by
the sixth year after an election. The eventual decay in these e↵ects could be the result of
endogenous political responses to policy changes whereby voters punish legislators for large
changes in the status quo.
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Figure 8: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on per capita county expenditures 1-6 years
after an election.
Next, we turn to the e↵ect of legislative partisanship on spending across di↵erent policy
areas. Figure 9 shows the e↵ect of legislative partisanship in the average county on overall
24 In Appendix C, we demonstrate the robustness of this result to di↵erent modeling choices. First, we show
that it is robust to di↵erent bandwidths for the RD model. We also show that we obtain similar results
using higher order polynomials for our RD models. Finally, we show that we obtain similar results using
local randomization in a narrow 1% bandwidth close to the discontinuity using the default options in the
rdlocrand package in R (Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare, 2016).
25 For this analysis, we subset our data to elections held between 1990-2010 to ensure that each time horizon
uses a similar dataset.
26 The lack of an e↵ect in t+1 can be seen as a placebo e↵ect since new legislators generally cannot a↵ect
the budget in the first fiscal year after they’re elected. Thus, it is not surprising that we see no e↵ect there.
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Figure 9: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged program-area per capita
expenditures in the fiscal years two and three years after an election. Thick bars show 90%
confidence intervals and thin bars show 95% confidence intervals.
spending as well as individual categories of county spending. The top row shows our main
result that electing a Democrat rather than a Republican leads to an increase of 5.5% in
the average county’s spending. Moving down from the top row, each point shows the ef-
fect of electing a Democrat in the average county on changes in spending per capita in a
given spending area. We group individual spending categories into more coherent categories
to reduce noise due to massive variation in many of the spending categories.27 While the
statistical significance of di↵erent spending areas varies, the point estimates for individual
27 Even within county, this variation is enormous in many of the spending categories in the Census Fiscal
Data. For example, the standard deviation in our main outcome of logged changes in total expenditures
is 0.16. In contrast, the standard deviation of logged changes in library spending is 1.2 and the standard
deviation of logged changes in welfare spending is 1.1. It is possible that this variation stems from mea-
surement error in counties’ reporting for individual spending categories, or is driven by the many counties
that spend little or nothing on many of the individual spending categories.
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spending areas are almost all positive. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we
find that Democratic legislators increase spending on social programs, such as health, hos-
pitals, housing and welfare, by about 9% relative to Republicans. We find robust evidence
that Democratic legislators substantially increase spending on parks and natural resources.
There is also borderline significant evidence that Democratic legislators increase spending
on roads.28 We also find large, but insignificant, point estimates of the e↵ect of electing a
Democratic legislator on education and libraries, and sanitation and utilities.29 However, we
find little evidence that the election of Democratic legislators influences the amount of money
spent on interest, administration, and public safety. This null result on the final category
of spending is especially interesting, as the evidence from cities indicates that Democratic
politicians may spend less on policing than Republicans. This may be due to the indepen-
dent authority exerted by separately elected county o cials, such as sheri↵s, who often wield
significant control over the implementation of criminal justice policy within counties, even if
they have no direct control over the budget (Farris and Holman, 2015, 2017).
We next address the e↵ect of the partisanship of legislators on changes in county revenues
(Figure 10). We find that the election of a Democratic legislator in the average county
increases total county revenues an average of about 3% in the fiscal years two and three
years after an election. Figure 10 also shows the e↵ects on individual revenue sources. We
find no evidence that Democratic legislators increase taxes or intergovernmental revenues.
Consistent with the findings in de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) for municipal
governments, we also find suggestive evidence that Democratic legislators increase debt, but
this result is not statistically significant.
28 These results are all significant at the p=0.1 level.
29 Full tabular results for these spending areas are in Appendix D. This table also shows the details of
the models, such as the bandwidth, robust confidence intervals, and p-values. In Appendix D, we also
break down these results into even broader categories originally developed by Peterson (1981), who argued
that local expenditures can be categorized as as developmental, allocational, and redistributive policy.
We find that the point estimates for redistribution and developmental expenditures are both positive
and significant at the 10% level, while the e↵ect on allocational expenditures is much smaller, and not
statistically distinguishable from zero.
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Figure 10: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged per capita revenues
in the fiscal years two and three years after an election. Thick bars show 90% confidence
intervals and thin bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Moderators
In this section, we examine circumstances and institutional characteristics of counties that
might moderate the e↵ect of partisanship on policy. Overall, we find that the influence of
the partisan election of county legislators on policy may be driven in part by the power
those legislators wield due to the pivotality of elections for partisan control, counties’ form
of government, the size of their legislature, or their reliance on state funding. However, there
are two important caveats to these results. First, these di↵erences are not causally identified
and might be confounded by any number of omitted variables. Second, the di↵erences across
institutions never reach the level of statistical significance. Thus, we regard these results on
moderators of partisan e↵ects as suggestive rather than the last word on this subject.
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First, we examine whether the e↵ect of individual legislators is larger when they have the
potential to influence partisan control of the legislature. Specifically, we analyze whether the
e↵ect of partisan selection on county spending is larger in legislatures where, at the time of
the election, the partisan majority is small compared to the e↵ect when one party controls a
large proportion of the legislature.30 In closely divided legislatures, an additional Democratic
legislator could influence majority control of the body, while in more extreme legislatures
the partisan majority is unlikely to change. We might therefore expect to observe a larger
e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator rather than a Republican legislator in these more
evenly split legislatures.
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Figure 11: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged per capita expenditures
by the partisan majority’s margin. Thick bars show 90% confidence intervals and thin bars
show 95% confidence intervals.
Although the di↵erences are not statistically significant, we find suggestive evidence that
the election of partisan legislators has a larger influence on policy when the legislature is
closer to evenly split between parties. The top line in Figure 11 indicates the e↵ect of electing
a Democratic legislator rather than a Republican legislator in these closely-split legislatures
(i.e., where a swing of 1 or 2 seats determines majority control), while the second line
indicates this e↵ect in legislatures with three or more seats majority. In the closely-split
legislatures electing one more Democrat leads to an increase in spending of about 7%, while
in legislatures that lean more heavily to one party or the other this e↵ect is only 3% — less
30 To divide up our county legislatures in this way requires knowing how pivotal seati in that legislature is
– that is, whether or not the election in a given seat has the potential to change the majority. We assess
pivotality by calculating the partisan majority that exists after removing seati.
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than half the size of the e↵ect in more closely divided legislatures. This subgroup di↵erence
is suggestive evidence that when there are closer partisan majorities, electing an additional
legislator of a given party can have a greater e↵ect on policy.
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Figure 12: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged per capita expenditures
by the size of the county legislature. Thick bars show 90% confidence intervals and thin bars
show 95% confidence intervals.
Second, we might expect the e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator to be larger in
counties with small legislatures since each legislator has more voting power than in a legisla-
ture with many members. To assess this, Figure 12 shows the e↵ect of electing a Democrat
rather than a Republican legislator on county spending, broken down by the overall size of
the legislature. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the partisanship of county
legislators has a large e↵ect on county spending in counties with only 3 members of the
legislature. In these counties, electing a Democratic legislator increases spending by about
11%. In larger counties, electing a Democratic legislator has smaller e↵ects on spending.
This may be partially due to the larger impact of a single election on the chamber’s median
ideology in small legislatures.
Third, individual legislators may also wield more power in counties with the commission
form of government, in which legislators often lead a certain department of county gov-
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Figure 13: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged per capita expenditures
by the county’s form of government. Thick bars show 90% confidence intervals and thin bars
show 95% confidence intervals.
ernment, relative to counties with elected executives or the council form of government.31
Figure 13 shows suggestive evidence that the e↵ects of electing a Democratic legislator are
larger in counties with commissions than in other counties. Moreover, we find that electing
a Democrat has essentially no e↵ect in counties with an elected executive.32
Finally, county elections might have larger policy e↵ects in counties that have more
budgetary flexibility. Counties with less reliance on intergovernmental revenue may have
more independent power. In Figure 14, we compare counties in states where the average
proportion of county revenue that comes from intergovernmental sources is more than 35%
and less than 35%. This shows suggestive evidence that the partisanship of county legislators
matters more in states where counties are less dependent on intergovernmental revenue.33
In Appendix E, we further explore other potential moderators by examining heterogeneity
in the e↵ect of partisan selection by region, by time period, by urban vs. rural counties,
by population size, and by partisan control of the state government. We find suggestive
31 We gathered form of government data from the ICMA, the 1987 Census of Governments, and manual
research. It is worth noting that our coding of form of government may have measurement error. For
example, we found it very di cult to determine the di↵erence between commission and council-manager
governments in our manual research.
32 However, it is hard to disentangle whether the larger e↵ect in counties with commissions is truly driven
by the form of government or the small size of these legislatures (see the Appendix for more details).
33 However, the di↵erence between these two subsets is not statistically significant.
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evidence that the e↵ects of electing a Democratic county legislator are larger in the past
decade than during the 1990s.34
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Figure 14: The e↵ect of legislative partisanship on changes in logged per capita expenditures
by the percent of revenue from intergovernmental sources. Thick bars show 90% confidence
intervals and thin bars show 95% confidence intervals.
34 The increase in the policy e↵ects of the partisan composition over time is consistent with the findings of
Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu (2017) at the state-level.
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Conclusion
County governments play an important role in American democracy. However, there has been
little previous research about the e↵ect of elections on county fiscal policies. In this paper,
we have shown that the partisan composition of county legislatures has a significant e↵ect on
county fiscal policies. Counties with more Democratic legislators spend more than counties
with Republican legislators. We find this e↵ect using two separate analytical strategies
applied to an original dataset of nearly ten thousand county elections. The e↵ects we observe
in individual policy areas are especially surprising. For instance, we observe a robust e↵ect of
partisanship on redistributive policies — in contrast to the argument made by Peterson that
redistribution is an area where local governments are particularly constrained and “where
certain kinds of citizen needs and preferences seldom become demands” (Peterson, 1981, p.
182). In addition, we find that counties with more Democratic legislators also raise more
revenue than counties with Republican legislators.
Why do county policies exhibit these e↵ects, when the bulk of the previous literature on
counties has emphasized the constraints on local policymaking? There are several possible
explanations. One simple explanation may be that counties operate much like other local
governments, such as cities — where recent research indicates that constraints do not elim-
inate the e↵ects of partisanship. In addition, the constraints on county governments might
not be as significant as previously argued. Perhaps receiving a large portion of funding from
states and federal governments is not that constraining for counties at the margin, and so
they have some degree of leeway within their budget to adjust policy when local representa-
tives from di↵erent parties are elected. In addition, our exploration of moderators suggests
that certain institutional configurations of counties may allow for more flexibility by county
governments to change policy. In particular, when individual elected o cials are a↵orded
more power via the design of county government or rely less on other levels of government,
the election of partisans has larger e↵ects on fiscal policy. The institutions of government
may a↵ect the quality of representation in counties in the United States.
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Overall, our findings contribute to a growing literature on the policy consequences of par-
tisan control of state and local government. The partisan composition of county governments
matters. Despite the lack of attention on the politics of county governments, we demonstrate
that county-level policy is influenced by some of the same political patterns evident in the
United States as a whole. Much as it does in Congress, states, and cities, partisan selection
plays a powerful role in county politics. When voters elect Democratic county legislators
rather than Republican legislators, the county policies that result will change in accordance
with the leanings of those partisan representatives. County elections, then, may be a vehicle
by which policy responsiveness operates at the local level. Since counties spend hundreds
of billions of dollars of taxpayer money and conduct thousands of elections each year, the
health of county democracy is important for democracy writ large in the United States.
While we demonstrate one role that elections play in representation in county govern-
ments here, the politics of local governments remains an area of study with numerous ques-
tions still open. For one, the results of this paper leave unanswered the impact of elections
and partisanship on other policies that are not easily measured with fiscal data. More-
over, it is unclear exactly what role partisanship and ideology play in representation via city
councils, school boards, and many of the other legislatures and boards that make decisions
in local politics. Research on counties — as well as these other local governments — has
the potential to expand the overall body of knowledge about local politics and democratic
governance in the United States.
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A Descriptive Statistics on Sample of Counties
Descriptive statistics for the counties that we use in our final sample of elections are
presented in Table A1. In the first column, we report summary statistics (mean and
standard deviation) for several characteristics. Since we choose to focus on counties
over a population threshold of 150,000 people and which have partisan elections,
we present the same descriptive statistics for this universe of counties in the second
column.1 Our final sample consists of 298 of these 319 counties. Our sample of
counties does not have significant di↵erences relative to our target set of counties in
any of these descriptive characteristics.
We also present these same statistics for all counties in the U.S. in the third
column of Table A1. Because we focus our sample on larger counties, our sample is
unsurprisingly biased in its average size relative to all counties in the U.S. Relative
to the entire country, our sample is also somewhat regionally weighted towards the
northeast. It is made up of counties that are slightly less white and slightly more black
than cities across the entire country, as well as more educated, of higher income, and
with a higher median home value.
Table A1: City Summary Statistics
Final Sample >150k population All U.S. counties
Population 432,506 422,507 89,733
(509,639) (495,874) (292,675)
% West 14% 13% 14%
(35) (34) (35)
% South 41% 42% 45%
(49) (49) (50)
% Northeast 21% 22% 7%
(41) (41) (25)
% White 80% 80% 84%
(13) (13) (17)
% Black 11% 11% 9%
(11) (11) (15)
% College degree or more 17% 17% 11%
(6) (6) (5)
Median household income 45,881 45,608 35,374
(10,284) (10,183) (8,906)
Median home value 120,273 119,266 81,327
(41,728) (41,539) (42,236)
Number of counties 298 319 3,136
Statistics are from 2000 U.S Census data. Standard deviations in parentheses.
1This excludes counties in CA, MN, WI, AK, SD, ND, and LA, as well as some counties in FL.
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We also compute descriptive statistics on the finances of the counties that we use
in our final sample of elections, presented in Table A2 for those that had finances
data available for 2012. In the first column, we report summary statistics (mean and
standard deviation) for per capita expenditures and revenue across several categories.
We present the same descriptive statistics for the target universe of large counties
with partisan elections in the second column, and again for all counties in the U.S.
in the third column of Table A2. Our sample of counties closely resembles our target
universe of counties.
Counties divided their expenditures among a variety of categories, and similarly
raised their revenue from a variety of sources, but this also changed over time. Fig-
ure A1 shows the division of total expenditures into a variety of categories in counties
in our target universe of large counties from 1990 to 2014. Across the entire time
period, counties spent the largest amount on education, administration, welfare, and
healthcare. While the level of most of these spending areas is relatively constant over
time, education expenditures rise rise by a large degree between 1990 and 2012 in the
average county. In line with national trends, healthcare costs also rise steadily from
1990 to the present.
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Figure A1: Expenditures over time, individual categories (target universe)
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Table A2: City Finances Summary Statistics, 2012 dollars per capita
Final Sample >150k population All U.S. counties
Total Expenditures 1271 1239 1469
(1049) (1039) (1755)
Education 249 241 215
(602) (591) (608)
Fire 22 21 18
(47) (46) (58)
Police 89 88 106
(79) (78) (112)
Health 99 97 87
(113) (112) (149)
Highways 67 68 189
(59) (58) (313)
Housing 16 16 9
(35) (34) (28)
Libraries 12 12 10
(18) (18) (31)
Parks 26 25 19
(37) (36) (61)
Sanitation 36 35 12
(125) (123) (58)
Utilities 34 33 25
(76) (74) (214)
Welfare 118 115 91
(171) (172) (171)
Interest 51 50 41
(60) (59) (288)
Administration 120 118 156
(75) (74) (203)
Total Revenues 1254 1223 1492
(1016) (1005) (1765)
Own Sources 871 849 993
(758) (747) (1342)
Total Taxes 547 535 572
(502) (493) (920)
Sales Taxes 125 123 104
(163) (164) (198)
Property Taxes 374 366 432
(327) (321) (868)
Debt 1216 1184 897
(1253) (1235) (5039)
Intergovernmental 383 375 499
(366) (363) (736)
Number of counties 292 309 2793
Statistics are from the Census of Governments Finances data in 2012, and therefore eliminate coun-
ties that did not report financial data in 2012. Standard deviations in parentheses.
A-4
B Further Details on Validity of Regression Dis-
continuity Design
The key identifying assumption of the RD design is that the distribution of units’ po-
tential outcomes is continuous at the treatment threshold (Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw,
2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In some electoral settings the continuity assumption
appears to be violated due to incumbents’ ability to win narrow victories (Caughey
and Sekhon, 2011). However, Eggers et al. (2015) find no evidence of pro-incumbent
sorting in a variety of electoral contexts. Consistent with Eggers et al.’s (2015) find-
ings, we find no statistically significant discontinuities (i.e., placebo e↵ects) using
similar RD models as in our main paper.
Table B1: Covariate continuity tests for the County Legislative RD design
Outcome Variable Estimate Pr > |z| E↵. N BW
Lagged Running Variable (Dem. Vote Share) -0.008 0.591 2517 10.604
Lagged Treatment Variable (Dem. Legislator) 0.093 0.198 2503 10.285
Contemporaneous Logged Per Capita Expenditures -0.095 0.269 3539 11.576
Contemporaneous Change in Logged Per Capita Exp.’s 0.016 0.143 3056 9.928
Contemporaneous Democratic Seat Share 0.05 0.315 2619 9.357
Estimated using the default local-linear regression bandwidth (BW) and robust confidence intervals
calculated by rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014).
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C Robustness of Main Results
This appendix shows the robustness of our main results on total county expenditures
to di↵erent modeling choices. First, Table C1 shows that the main results are sub-
stantively similar using a variety of di↵erent bandwidths for the RD model. Second,
Table C1 shows that we obtain similar results using higher order polynomials for
our RD models. Finally, the last line of Table C1 shows that we obtain similar re-
sults using local randomization in a narrow 1% bandwidth close to the discontinuity
using the default options in the rdlocrand package in R (Cattaneo, Titiunik, and
Vazquez-Bare, 2016).
Table C1: Robustness of Main Results to Di↵erent Modeling Choices.
Weighted RD Unweighted RD
Model Polynomial Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
Main Results (optimal BW) 1 0.055 0.018 2214 6.765 0.037 0.015 2603 8.18
2nd order polynomial 2 0.063 0.007 4128 14.284 0.044 0.012 4108 14.152
3rd order polynomial 3 0.068 0.055 4425 15.659 0.049 0.025 4839 18.27
4th order polynomial 4 0.063 0.111 4812 18.07 0.039 0.172 4687 17.295
1% bandwith 1 0.036 0.529 403 1 0.004 0.985 403 1
2% bandwith 1 0.073 0.416 750 2 0.045 0.86 750 2
3% bandwith 1 0.076 0.239 1073 3 0.046 0.321 1073 3
4% bandwith 1 0.058 0.041 1392 4 0.036 0.099 1392 4
5% bandwith 1 0.052 0.046 1701 5 0.037 0.094 1701 5
Randomization Inference NA NA NA NA NA 0.039 0.048 403 1
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D Main Results in Tabular Form
In the main text of the paper we present our results in graphical form. Here we
present these results for minimally-aggregated categories of expenditures (Table D1)
and revenue and debt (Table D2).
Table D1: Expenditure Results.
Outcome variable (all variables are changes) Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
Total Expenditures 0.055 0.018 2214 6.765
(0.011, 0.118)
Police, Fire, and Corrections 0.014 0.479 3033 9.672
(-0.032, 0.068)
Redistribution (Health, Hospitals, Housing, & Welfare) 0.092 0.024 2107 6.34
(0.015, 0.216)
Education and Libraries 0.153 0.18 4386 15.461
(-0.081, 0.431)
Roads 0.19 0.057 3331 10.732
(-0.007, 0.463)
Parks and Natural Resources 0.249 0.043 2726 8.621
(0.009, 0.537)
Sanitation and Utilities 0.149 0.366 2802 8.901
(-0.175, 0.475)
Interest 0.058 0.511 2772 8.782
(-0.114, 0.229)
Admin. and Misc. 0.024 0.246 2783 8.803
(-0.023, 0.088)
Table D2: Revenue Results.
Outcome variable (all variables are changes) Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
Total Revenues 0.03 0.066 2669 8.42
(-0.002, 0.074)
Total Taxes 0.01 0.537 3207 10.305
(-0.022, 0.043)
Sales Taxes -0.121 0.277 2813 8.949
(-0.392, 0.113)
Property Taxes 0.031 0.295 3484 11.351
(-0.035, 0.115)
Charges and Misc. Rev. 0.045 0.279 2490 7.785
(-0.042, 0.146)
Intergov. Rev. -0.013 0.73 2783 8.801
(-0.108, 0.076)
Debt 0.087 0.212 2681 8.467
(-0.062, 0.277)
We also further aggregate our spending variables into fewer spending categories
to reduce noise and to test existing theories of urban policy, particularly those in
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Peterson (1981). Figure D1 aggregates our spending measures into the three cate-
gories originally developed by Peterson (1981). He argued that local expenditures
can be categorized as as developmental, allocational, and redistributive. He classified
education as a separate category since it had both developmental and redistribu-
tive aspects. As described by Choi et al. (2010), “Development policy focuses on
attracting and stimulating economic growth and development through spending on
highways, utilities, water transportation, parking, sewage, and other services that
promote the economic position of a locality by facilitating economic growth. Gov-
ernments must also carry out police power functions as well as provide basic services
that do not necessarily have substantial redistributive consequences. These alloca-
tional or ‘housekeeping’ services include police, fire, and street maintenance services,
employee security, general public buildings, parks and recreation, general govern-
ment, and financial administration. Allocational policies are neutral in their impact
on the economic position of the community, although they may disproportionately
benefit property owners... Redistributive policies target benefits to less advantaged
residents... including public welfare, housing and community development, health,
and hospitals.”
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Figure D1: Aggregated spending categories from Peterson (1981).
We find that the point estimates for redistribution and developmental expendi-
tures are similar and large. But the e↵ect on allocational spending is much smaller,
and possibly null. As discussed in the main paper, this contrasts with theoretical
expectations from Peterson (1981) on redistributive policies, especially.
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E Tests of Moderators
Variation in the institutions and descriptive characteristics of counties may help ex-
plain why these e↵ects exist — in other words, the moderators for our main e↵ects.
In the main text, we examine four such moderators: whether an election is likely to
influence the majority coalition, the relative voting power of an individual legisla-
ture, the form of county government, and the degree of constraints on county fiscal
policies. In this appendix, we examine additional potential moderators: by region,
by time period, by urban vs. rural counties, by population size, and by control of
state government. However, these results should be interpreted cautiously as none of
the institutional variation is causally identified, and therefore any di↵erences in our
treatment e↵ects across subgroups could be confounded by any number of omitted
variables — even other institutional and descriptive characteristics that we examine
here.
1) Region
In Table E1, we examine how the size of county legislatures varies between di↵er-
ent regions. Here, we find some degree of geographic heterogeneity. Most very large
legislatures with more than 10 members are found in the east and midwest. How-
ever, these states also have a large number of very small legislatures with only three
members. In the west and south, virtually no counties have large legislatures. And
in the south, very few have small legislatures either. We can also examine variation
in the e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator between counties in di↵erent regions.
In Table E2, we find that the e↵ects are broadly similar in di↵erent regions, although
the results are noisy due to small sample sizes.
Table E1: Proportion of counties in each region with small, medium, and large legis-
latures
N 3 4-10 10+
East 61 0.40 0.35 0.24
Midwest 67 0.30 0.33 0.36
South 120 0.03 0.84 0.13
West 41 0.54 0.46 0.00
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Table E2: Heterogeneity in e↵ect of legislator partisanship across regions
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
East 0.075 0.213 795 9.234
(-0.054, 0.243)
Midwest 0.054 0.082 818 7.335
(-0.009, 0.148)
South 0.037 0.223 756 9.401
(-0.029, 0.125)
West 0.036 0.333 278 8.289
(-0.037, 0.11)
2) Time period
Next, we examine whether the e↵ects of legislators’ partisanship on county spend-
ing has changed over time, perhaps due to the growth in partisan polarization over the
past few decades. Indeed we find that electing a Democratic county legislator had no
significant e↵ect on county spending during the period between 1990 and 2002 (Table
E3). However, it had a large and significant e↵ect between 2003 and 2012. This sup-
ports the evidence found in states that the policy e↵ects of the partisan composition
of government have grown over time (Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu, 2017).
Table E3: Heterogeneity in e↵ect of legislator partisanship across time
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
1990-2002 0.019 0.337 1242 7.707
(-0.029, 0.083)
2003-2013 0.091 0.017 1207 7.521
(0.019, 0.193)
3) Urban vs. Rural Counties
Here, we examine how the size of our e↵ects varies between urban and rural
counties. We divide our dataset into counties with more than 15% of the population
is rural compared to counties where less than 15% of the population is rural, and
examine variation in the e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator between urban and
rural counties. These results are in Table E4, which shows suggestive evidence that
the e↵ect is larger in more urban counties. However, the di↵erence between urban
and rural counties is not statistically significant.
We also examine whether this variation could be due to the size of the legislature.
In Table E5, we show how the size of county legislature varies between counties
with some substantial rural component and those that are almost entirely urban. It
indicates that there is little di↵erence in the size of legislatures between urban and
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Table E4: Heterogeneity in e↵ect of legislator partisanship across more urban and
rural counties
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
Rural 0.031 0.149 817 8.196
(-0.016, 0.107)
Urban 0.062 0.048 1651 7.527
(0.001, 0.141)
rural counties. This indicates that the size of the legislature is unlikely to be driving
the di↵erences between e↵ects in rural and urban counties.
Table E5: Proportion of urban and rural counties with small, medium, and large
legislatures
N 3 4-10 10+
Rural (>15% Rural) 108 0.32 0.49 0.19
Urban (<15% Rural) 181 0.20 0.62 0.17
4) Population
We also examine heterogeneity in the e↵ect of electing a Democratic legislator
across counties with di↵erent populations. Consistent with the theoretical expecta-
tions we briefly discuss in the paper, we do find some evidence that the e↵ects of
electing a Democratic legislator are larger in counties with larger populations. How-
ever, the results are very noisy and non-monotonic in their variation according to
county size. Moreover, these non-causal di↵erences could be confounded by other
di↵erences in the structure of county governments. For instance, they are almost
certainly confounded by variation in the size of county legislatures across counties.
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Table E6: Heterogeneity in e↵ect of legislator partisanship by county size
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
Main E↵ect 0.055 0.018 2214 6.765
(0.011, 0.118)
<150,000 0.014 0.64 864 10.424
(-0.053, 0.086)
150,000-250,000 0.014 0.484 733 8.729
(-0.048, 0.101)
250,000-400,000 0.099 0.019 560 6.997
(0.019, 0.212)
400,000-800,000 0.068 0.266 623 9.25
(-0.064, 0.232)
>800,000 0.028 0.167 689 10.748
(-0.015, 0.088)
5) Partisan Control of State Government
Finally, we examine whether the partisan control of the state government a↵ects
the impact of county legislators’ partisanship on policy. We might expect that the
ability of county legislators to change policy depends on the state government’s overall
attitude towards county spending, which might di↵er between Democrats and Repub-
licans. At the national level, Republican legislators have often favored devolution of
authority to states in their rhetoric and party platforms.2 An analogous attitude
towards delegation by state politicians to local governments might allow county legis-
latures under Republican state governments to have more latitude in changing policy.
Table E7: Heterogeneity in e↵ect of legislator partisanship based on partisan control
of state government
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >|z| E↵. N BW
Unified Democratic Control 0.076 0.195 721 8.943
(-0.048, 0.234)
Split Control 0.035 0.146 1131 6.614
(-0.017, 0.113)
Unified Republican Control 0.076 0.004 504 8.406
(0.029, 0.153)
Contrary to this expectation, we find that the e↵ect of electing a Democratic
legislator rather than a Republican legislator does not depend on partisan control of
the state’s government. In Table E7 we show our main e↵ects of the partisanship of
2 However, see SoRelle and Walker (2016) for evidence that this pattern in rhetoric does not bear
out in actual Congressional preemption of state policies.
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a county legislator on spending, separated between counties in which there is unified
Democratic control of the state government (in the first line), split control (in the
middle line), and unified Republican control (in the final line). Under Republican and
Democratic state governments, the election of county legislators has an equivalent
e↵ect on policy.
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F Matching of Candidates to Campaign Contribu-
tions Data
To measure the ideology of county legislators in the absence of direct data on their
policy positions or preferences, we use the “CFscores” developed by Adam Bonica
(Bonica, 2014). These scores are based on the campaign contributions of millions of
constituents and candidates in federal and state elections. The intuition behind them
is relatively simple: by creating a large matrix of the matchup between contributors
and candidates for federal and state elections whom they contribute to, CFscores are
able to estimate the ideology of both contributors and candidates. The key assump-
tion behind this method of estimation is that contributors donate — on average —
to more ideologically proximate candidates than more distant ones. This results in
scores for both candidates and contributors along a continuum of ideology. Though
scores based on contributions to the county legislators in our data are not available
as local-level campaign finance data is not widely available, we can use the donor CF
scores that are available for legislators that make donations to other candidates in
state and federal elections.
To incorporate this measure of ideology, we match the candidate names in our
county elections data to the names in the contributor database of 15 million con-
tributors in the 1980-2012 election cycles (Bonica, 2013). Specifically, we take the
CFscore from the contributor matching the full name and county of residence of each
candidate to donors who made a contribution within six years of the first or last time
they appear in our elections data. For candidates who matched multiple distinct
contributors across multiple election cycles but who each had the same CFscore, we
simply assigned them that single CFscore. For those candidates who matched con-
tributors with more than one unique CFscore and for candidates who matched more
than one contributor within the strict time and location frames that we used to search
for matches, we did not assign a CFscore.
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